ABSTRACT Emissions trading schemes on entity level are becoming more and more important in the context of controlling greenhouse gases. The directive on a Europe-wide trading scheme is a prime example. Prior to the start of such a scheme, a number of design features have to be agreed upon. Regarding the allocation of allowances, a distribution that is (almost) free of charge has been the method of choice. An aspect that has interestingly attracted little attention thus far is the question of how to allocate emission rights over time, i.e. in single, subsequent periods that exist in real trading schemes. In this paper, different allocation options are applied to the electricity sector. A power market that mirrors reality with five different types of power plants (hydro, nuclear, lignite, coal and gas) is 
Introduction
In the context of environmental regulation, emissions trading has garnered more and more support in recent years (Stavins 2003) . On installation level, the most important example system is the European emissions trading scheme (EU-ETS) that started in 2005. In this scheme, certain installations, i.e. major immobile sources of GHGs are obliged to participate in a cap and trade scheme. The allocation of allowances, i.e. of emission entitlements 1 , is perceived as a very important issue from the companies' point of view and has been part of intensive bargaining so far. Two main approaches have been focussed on during the discussion between governments and participants, namely an allocation based on emissions in a reference year and the use of an emission benchmark. With both options, allowances are distributed free of charge. However the question of how to design the allocation over time, i.e.
in subsequent periods, has attracted little attention thus far. The impact of different allocation options on single installations has only rarely been addressed (for example Burtraw et al. 2001 , Bode 2006 . Existing literature, which is briefly reviewed below, generally either concentrates on the sector level or provides an analytical analyses.
Against this background, the present article analyses the impact of different allocation options on installations in the electricity sector, which is the major emitter of carbon dioxide compared to other stationary sources. The focus is on the relative impacts of the allocation on different power plants subject to the scheme. Effects on installations that are not subject to the trading system are not considered.
A simulation of an artificial but realistic electricity market is provided. The analysis is limited to a short-term perspective. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that politically, a shortterm perspective is likely to influence current legislation the most. On the other hand, the path for auctioning the allowances is already slightly paved in the European scheme. With a 100 percent auctioning however, the problems discussed below do not exist anymore.
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The paper is structured as follows: The following section reviews the impact of emissions trading on firms from a theoretical perspective. Section three discusses different options for 1 The term emission right and allowance are used interchangeably.
allocating allowances free of charge and the implications for multi-period emissions trading.
A numerical example for the electricity sector is analysed in detail in section four. Section five concludes.
Emissions trading and its impact on firms
Emissions trading is a market based instrument. It allows a cost-efficient meeting of a predefined emission target. In the equilibrium, marginal abatement costs are the same for all participants. They are not obliged to use a certain technology for emission reductions. The only obligation they have to fulfil is to surrender as many emission allowances as the emissions they released into the atmosphere during a given period in time. They are then free to reduce emissions internally or to buy allowances on the market. Whether or not to buy is a question of in-house marginal abatement costs 3 and the allowance price. Whichever is cheaper is chosen.
Implementing emissions trading schemes requires a number of decisions to be taken regarding the design. 4 One aspect is the allocation of the allowances. They may either be provided free of charge or for a fee. Economists have argued in favour of a fee-based allocation or, more precisely, an auction at least for schemes on company level. An allocation free of charge would result in extra revenue for the recipients of the allowances and in reduced efficiency on a macro-economic level (Cramton and Kerr 2002 , FIELD 2000 p. 31, Speck 1999 , Woerdman 2000 ). Parry (2002, p. 7) argues that there is also a strong case for auctioning on distributional grounds. Bohm (2002) argues that this question can only be answered when comparing the concrete designs of different schemes. Burtraw et al. (2001) compare three different allocation options for the electricity sector in the US. They find that the costs to society are about one-half with auctioning compared to the two free of charge options.
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Emitters have so far asked for an allocation free of charge. 6 They argue that the additional financial burden of paying the fees would be too high.
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The argument of the additional financial costs is only partly true. Allowances are scarce, at least at the start of the scheme. Thus, there will be a price for allowances although they are allocated for free. Their use for production involves an opportunity cost as they can be sold in the case of non-production. Consequently producers will raise the product prices according to the product's emission intensity and the costs for emitting carbon.
The effect on the market can be studied in comparison to a per unit tax. 8 Assume a competitive market for a certain product. Denote the demand curve for the product by D and the supply prior to the implementation of the trading scheme by S 1 (see Figure 1 ). The equilibrium price p * and the corresponding quantity q * arise from the intersection of the two curves. Assume that a competitive allowance market emerges. All participants face the same CO 2 price that translates into opportunity costs within the firms' cost and pricing strategy. In the case of all producers having the same emission intensity per unit of output, the additional opportunity costs for CO 2 emissions result in an upward shift of the supply curve (see S 2 in Figure 1 ). This shift in turn results in a new equilibrium with the equilibrium quantity q # .
Consumers face the price p # . Producers collect the sum that would have been transferred to government in the case of an introduction of a per unit tax. The magnitude of the additional rent depends on the slope of the supply and demand curve.
In the context of the EU ETS these windfall profits, especially those collected in the electricity sector, have been criticised. To reduce these windfall profits, partial auctioning would be one solution. Goulder (2002) analysed this issue for the US fossil fuel industries. He finds that only about 13 percent of allowances need to be distributed free of charge if a loss of profit for these industries is to be avoided. . Stavins (2003) reports the same for the relevant non-GHG trading schemes in the US. 8 For general example see Pashigian (1995, pp. 313-316) ; for the specific comparison Goulder (2002) . 9 Regarding the EU trading scheme, current legislation already provides the possibility for such a change. See footnote 7. With regard to the financial implications from emissions trading for companies there are two aspects. First, the market effect, i.e. the windfall profits, and second compliance costs. The latter accrue from buying or selling allowances on the market. Both aspects will be analysed in more detail below.
Options for allocating emission allowance free of charge in multi-period emissions trading
The options to allocate allowances free of charge are almost unlimited (AGE 2001 , AGO 1999 , Boemare et al. 2002 , CCAP 1999 , CCAP 2002 , Holmes et al. 2000 , MIES, 2000 , Nera 2002 , NZME 1998). However, two approaches have attracted special attention 10 :
• an allocation based on emissions in a certain period (what is referred to as emission based allocation below) • the use of a benchmark, i.e. specific emission factor With regard to the latter option, one should note that the benchmark has to be multiplied with the reference figure of the benchmark in order to get an absolute emission figure. Formulae are given below. Bode (2003) showed that top-down allocation approaches, i.e. approaches 10 See for example the existing schemes in the US or the national allocation plans under the EU ETS. (2004) analytically analyse different allocation options using multi-player/two-period models.
Companies are the same size and have a turnover of unity. Furthermore, they analyse the allowance market only.
Fischer (2001) shows that in general, rebating revenues from environmental regulation based on the firms' output can provide an incentive to increase output. This may result in suboptimal abatement behaviour compared to the social optimum. The reasoning behind this argument is that players must consider the opportunity costs of future allocations in today's cost functions as long as this future allocation is related to today's emission or production.
11 As foreseen by the emission targets of the Kyoto Protocol
There are thus two countervailing effects of different opportunity costs.
1) Opportunity costs for using entitlements received for free in the present period, which may increase total costs 2) Opportunity costs for allocations in future periods that may results in a reduction of total costs. This is depicted in Figure 2 . Equations are given in the model section below. different allocation schemes they also consider other issues such as the phasing out of nuclear energy and the aging of plants etc., so that a clear understanding of the impact of the allocation is not possible.
As mentioned above, Burtraw et al. (2001) study the electricity market in the US in terms of both its efficiency and equity. In a paper that follows (Burtraw et al. 2002) , the authors introduce "the auction paradox" according to which generators as whole would be better off under an auction than with a generation performance standard 12 , as electricity prices are higher in the case of the former. The concrete distributional effects depend on the fuel use in the power plant analysed and on whether or not a plant is entering the market. They compare two different allocation options free of charge 13 , namely grandfathering and a generation performance standard. While both consider generation as the metric for allocating the allowances, they differ in the reference period. The former uses a constant base year (and is thus equivalent to the "generation benchmark constant" in this paper) whereas the latter uses an updated one (which is equal to the "generation benchmark updating") 14 . However, they do not consider any emissions based allocation as is being discussed in Europe. From the European discussion it also seems somewhat strange that they allocate allowances to nonhydro renewable installations -at least for the performance standard approach. 15 Sijm et al.
(2005) study CO 2 price dynamics for the electricity sector under the EU trading scheme but do not focus on different allocation schemes. Bode (2006) focuses on the effects different allocations options have on the power generators in multi-period schemes. In order to avoid the consideration of the opportunity costs in future periods, he assumes a completely inelastic demand curve. Although this was meant well, it is not correct. On the contrary, the more inelastic the demand the greater the price effect on the power market (see Figure 2 ).
Against this background, the impact of different allocation rules in multi-period emissions trading for power generators is analysed in the next section. 12 The generation performance standard corresponds to the output-based allocation used in this paper. 13 Additionally, a revenue raising auction is analysed. 14 At least it seems to be equivalent. They author only state that according to grandfathering allowances are allocated "…on the basis of a historic measure such as emissions or generation." (Burtraw et al. 2002, p. 52) The context, however, suggest that generation is chosen. 15 It remains unclear whether allowances are allocated to non-hydro renewable installation under the grandfathering approach, too. In a sensitivity analysis allowances are even allocated to hydro and nuclear installations.
Multi-period emissions trading in the electricity sector
Among all stationary sources, the electricity sector has a major share of CO 2 emissions (UNFCCC 2005) . The sector is thus (technically) easy to regulate and to monitor. Power plants are indeed subject to different trading schemes.
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The power market has special characteristics compared to other products that must be considered during any analysis in this field. These are briefly described below.
Some explanatory remarks -supply and demand side characteristics
Electricity is a homogenous product for which different production options exist. These differ considerably with respect to specific GHG emissions. Lignite fired power plants incur the highest specific emissions. Other plants such as nuclear or renewable do not produced CO 2 emissions during production. The efficiency of the plant is also important with regard to the resulting emissions. Storage of electricity is possible, though much more complicated and expensive when compared to other goods.
As mentioned, the paper focuses on the short-term implications. The short-term electricity market is driven by short-term marginal costs (UBS 2003, p. 29) . The most important parts of these are fuel costs and operation and maintenance (Balmorel, 2001, p. 20) .
The different types of plant also differ with regard to technical aspects as for example operational flexibility. Consequently, they are differently suited to the provision of peak power. Demand varies throughout the day. Demand is generally low during the night when most people sleep and peaks at around noon. Demand also changes over the year.
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When supply and demand match in functioning markets, system economics will determine that the lowest marginal cost plant will be operated first (UBS 2003, p. 32) . A merit order curve develops. With changing demand the equilibrium price also changes during the day. 16 For example in the US Acid Rain and RECLAIM programmes or the EU-ETS
The impact of CO 2 costs CO 2 emissions imply external costs 18 . They are currently, however, rarely included in the production costs due to lack of appropriate regulation. In case it is done, production costs rise depending on the emission intensity and the costs, which in the case of emissions trading equals the allowance prices. With different additional costs, the merit order curve may change. For example, a plant with low operational costs and high specific CO 2 emissions that is competitive in the absence of carbon costs may become uncompetitive if costs for CO 2 emissions must be added to the operational costs. Consequently, the equilibrium price may also change.
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The Model
An artificial but close to reality power market is simulated in order to analyse the implication of different allocation options. It is important to note that effects outside the power sector are not considered.
The market
Two periods are studied and a perfectly competitive market is assumed. The supply side consists of i = 1, 2, …N installations which use either water, uranium, lignite, coal or natural gas as fuel.
With an allocation based on a constant reference figure, the individual short-term supply curve of installation i in hour t in period r is as follows 20 : Recalling the discussion on the opportunity costs for future periods, which show-up with an updating allocations scheme, the individual short-term supply curve must change for this allocation. In our case k changes as follows: The subtrahend in equation (3) represents the opportunity costs in the updating setting. They are a function of both allocation and allowance price in period r+1. The allocation in period r+1 in turn depends on the emissions or production respectively (depending on the allocation approach) in period r and the overall reduction obligation in period r+1. In the case of the operator not knowing the future he must make assumptions on their magnitude in period r already.
It is worthwhile to analyse equation (3) 
One can now see that in the case that the opportunity costs in the next period r+1 are greater than the costs in the period r, the plant offers at costs which are below its operational costs 
The magnitude of the fracture on the left side is likely to be around 1. However, the right hand side of the inequality is much harder to determine. As it depends on both the present and the future carbon price, the value is a function of absolute price levels as well as the relative difference between prices. Furthermore, we can see that the higher the absolute levels the less relevant the difference between the prices is and the more likely it is that the fraction becomes zero. Figure 3 shows this relationship for selected carbon prices. As one can see, there are price constellations where inequality (5) is fulfilled, especially when future prices are increasing. Thus, we cannot generally conclude whether or not the opportunity for the future allocation is greater than the carbon costs in the present period. Consequently, power prices may increase or decrease. In the context of this analysis it is reasonable to assume that the total budget of entitlements allocated for free is reduced over time and that it is zero at point T in the future 21 , i.e.
where r A = total quantity of allowances to be distributed for free in period r
The cumulative supply curve for all allocation options results in the following: No storage options are considered. Thus, for each hour the equilibrium is as follows:
Only one market considered. No distinction is made between different kinds of consumers (e.g. industrial vs. private consumers). Other costs such as for example transmission fees or taxes are neglected. 21 At the same time the quantity of entitlement auctioned may increase.
Emission targets
The total budget of allowances is given exogenously. It is defined as a percentage of the reference scenario without any policy interventions. The budget is distributed according to different allocation rules.
The allocation
Only CO 2 emitting plants receive allowances. 22 Four different allocation options are studied. allocation rules, abatement costs are not important. For the market analysis, emission intensity and the resulting carbon costs must be considered. The latter are the same for all market players and equal the allowance price. This is why no individual abatement options are considered below. 23 Assuming abatement costs and carbon costs to be of the same magnitude would be realistic in the case where the sector as a whole buys emission allowances on the market.
The assumption of a fixed total allowance budget and a fixed allowance price may seem counterintuitive. One might expect the carbon price to change according to the players' actions. However one has to keep in mind that the allocation can be done on the sector level in a single state 24 . The allowance market however, may comprise both other sectors and other states. Furthermore, additional emission rights from outside the trading scheme might be imported through other mechanisms. 25 In this case the electricity sector in one state can be considered to be a price taker on the allowance market.
The overall financial impact
The overall financial impact consists of two parts: the market effect and the compliance costs.
The market effect describes the price change on the electricity market due to the consideration of opportunity costs. As shown above, the price may increase or decrease. The compliance costs result from meeting the emission target. The profit of an installation for period r can be calculated as follows: Numerical analysis.
On the supply side, 110 power plants have been introduced. Table 1 gives an overview.
Further details can be found in Annex 2. Costs are constant over the two periods. The discount rate is zero. With these assumptions, total annual energy demand in the reference scenario amounts to 275
TWh/a.
As mentioned above, demand curves are assumed to be linear. As it is generally easier to avoid peak load than to reduce base load demand, two different slopes of the demand curve have been assumes. r t b , in equation (7) is set to -0.008 for the time between 8 am and 8 pm and to -0.008 for the period from 8 pm to 8 am. As supply and demand match hourly, 24 market equilibria per day are retrieved. This is schematically depicted in Figure 4 . 
Results
For a comparison of the different allocation schemes a reference scenario has been defined. In this scenario, no policy intervention takes place. As both allocation options differ considerably regarding the consideration of opportunity costs, the results are presented separately. Table 2 shows the results on the sector level for major variables for different carbon prices.
Allocation with a constant basis
The results on the level are the same for the two allocation options. As can be seen, the sectors gross margin increase significantly although the production decreases. This is due to the scarcity rents collected by the power operators. The results differ, however, on plant level. For reasons of simplicity, results are aggregated on fuel-type level in Table 3 . As can be seen, plant operators that use natural gas benefit the most. Their gross margin increases to more the 10000 percent of that of the reference case for both options. In addition to Table 3 it should be mentioned that lignite-fired plants loose heavily in terms of production but also experience corresponding gains due to the sale of surplus allowances which they do not need after production has decreased. As the base period / generation metric is constant, they can collect this rent eternally.
Allocation with updating
As described above, an allocation with an updating reference period or metric provides different incentives for the plant operators compared to the constant allocation. This is why the results in Table 4 are also given for each period.
As can be seen, the results do not only differ with respect to different carbon prices but also with respect to the allocation options. For price sets where (expected) future carbon price exceed the carbon price in the present period, the decreasing effect on the power price ( Figure   2 ) can clearly be seen. Referring to Figure 3 see also how the price change from the initial to the first period varies depending on absolute and relative carbon prices (line: "Price change period ref. case -> 1(%)"). As demand is elastic, both production and emissions increase in these cases, too.
27 Table 5 shows the result on the fuel-type level. As the price changes differ for the two allocation options, hydro and nuclear power plant operators now show preferences for the emissions based allocations that distinguish this approach from the former. 27 Remember the assumption that the sector as a whole is a price taker and that it cannot influence the carbon price. 
Allocation with a constant basis vs. updating
After comparing an emission based and a generation benchmark allocation for different base periods / generation metrics, Table 6 provides a comparison of the allocation with a constant basis vs. updating. As can be seen, all plant operators benefit the most in terms of change in gross margin under an allocation with a constant base period / generation metric. These results are different to Bode's (2006, p. 690 ) who finds other preferences at this stage. The differences can be explained by the neglect of opportunity costs for allowances allocated in the future periods under an updating allocation in that study.
However, within this constant allocation approach option, preferences vary as a function of fuel used. While hydro and nuclear power operators are indifferent, lignite fired power plants increase their gross margin most under an emissions based allocation. Coal and natural gas fired power plants benefit most from a benchmark based approach. 
Conclusion
Emission trading offers the opportunity to limit GHG emissions into the atmosphere costefficiently. This is one reason why the EU has decided to implement a Europe-wide trading scheme for major emissions sources such as combustion plants with a thermal power larger than 20 MW. However, many detailed design issues have not yet been decided upon. The question of how to allocate emission allowance over time is one of them.
This paper has analysed this point using the electricity sector as an example. Using a stylised power market, four different allocation options have been used to analyse the resulting impact on different types of plants. It turned out that the electricity sector as a whole is likely to benefit from the introduction of the trading scheme as long as the allowances are distributed free of charge. Under the assumptions made, it was found that all operators prefer an allocation based on constant base period / generation metric as their gross margin increases most with this option. Within this approach, preferences vary as a function of the fuel used.
The result may serve decision makers in industry and policy during the negotiations on the design of the scheme.
As one can see, a benchmark based allocation which takes into account the national budget (e.g. the Kyoto Commitment), results in an individual allocation which is only proportional to a participant's output in a certain period and not at all related to emission intensities. This might be somewhat surprising as the intention of the use of a benchmark is generally to consider the specific emissions.
29 28 Theoretically, any benchmark as, for example, labour productivity or turnover could be used for allocation.
For an emission benchmark, other reference figures than the output could also be used. 29 Compliance costs may of course differ.
